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ABSTRACT 
 The electromagnetic (EM) spectrum is an integral part of the modern battlefield, 
and the use of wireless connections presents both benefits and risks for U.S. forces. 5G 
New Radio (5G NR) represents the latest in wireless cellular technology and provides the 
foundation for a powerful network. However, the requirement for military 
communications to be low–probability of detection (LPD) and low–probability of 
intercept (LPI) makes 5G NR unsuitable for use in hostile environments in its current 
form. 5G NR initial access procedures were designed to provide a large area of coverage 
to a high number of users and results in substantial stray emissions. This research seeks to 
introduce a replacement procedure for 5G NR initial access utilizing a user 
equipment-side connection process (UECP). By capitalizing on the directionality of 
massive multiple-input multiple-output antenna arrays (MIMO) and utilizing a novel 
detection process known as passive array sweep listening (PASL), connections can be 
established between the user equipment (UE) and gNodeB (gNB) at ultra-low 
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). The performance of UECP was evaluated utilizing multiple 
simulations created in MATLAB. The ability of UECP to function at ultra-low SNRs, 
combined with the directionality of large antenna arrays, results in a substantial decrease 
of stray emissions normally found in 5G NR initial access, which greatly reduces the 
probability of intercept or detection. 
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A. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH 
As of the beginning of 2019, the United States Marine Corps began an intensive 
internal overhaul of force design to better posture itself to meet the challenges of modern 
warfare. A primary initiative outlined in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2019 
(CPG 2019), the central document which provides the strategic direction for the Marine 
Corps, is Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). EABO is intended to 
counteract our enemy’s desire to target “forward fixed and vulnerable bases” [1] by 
developing a force structure “not dependent on concentrated, vulnerable, and expensive 
forward infrastructure” [1]. An implicit requirement of this initiative is that forces must be 
highly mobile, as static units and command centers allow adversaries an advantage in the 
targeting process. An additional component of the CPG 2019 is the requirement for the 
development of “low probability of intercept (LPI) / low probability of detection (LPD) 
communications” [1] as “communications nodes will be hunted and targeted…[and] 
careless and unmanaged [electromagnetic (EM)] signatures will invite 
destruction…[which] will require interoperable, low signature, secure communications” 
[1]. This thesis intends to address the issues of mobility, LPI/LPD, and secure 
communications by proposing a novel connection method that would allow commercial 
5th generation mobile network – new radio (5G NR) technology to be incorporated into 
the Marine Corps’ (and larger military’s) command, control, communication, computers, 
and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure but still align with the desire for secure, LPI/LPD 
communications.  
B. MOTIVATION OF RESEARCH 
1. Risks Associated with Military Use of Wireless Communications 
The United States Military has long been caught between the need and desire to 
incorporate advanced wireless technologies into its C4I infrastructure and the requirement 
to maintain secure communications. Two major areas of concern in implementing wireless 
technologies are the security of the communications, that is, the certainty that information 
2 
relayed over wireless channels cannot be intercepted and used by an enemy, and the risks 
associated with the detection of wireless communications. Even if the information being 
transferred cannot be deciphered, detection alone can be catastrophic for a military unit as 
valuable information such as unit activity or geolocation data can be ascertained by 
detecting EM signals. 
2. Mobility 
Wireless technologies by their nature provide for increased mobility for the 
connected user or device. However, it is not simply the mobility of the user or device that 
is increased, it is the mobility of the system as well. A wireless system can be moved from 
location to location and either maintain or resume network operations orders of magnitude 
faster than its wired counterparts. 
3. Flexibility 
Wireless technology also provides a level of network flexibility not found in wired 
systems. Adjusting architecture, opening and closing connections, and expanding or 
contracting network size can all occur much faster and with less manpower required than 
wired systems.  
4. Benefits of 5G NR over Previous Wireless Technology 
5G NR offers many benefits over previous wireless technologies, most notably in 
the area of increased data rates, reaching speeds above one gigabit per second (Gbps) [2], 
physical layer security improvements over previous wireless technologies, and by taking a 
more holistic approach to security at all levels within the system [3]. Lastly, and most 
important to this research, is the implementation of massive multiple-input multiple-output 
(MIMO) technology in 5G NR which allows a system to “control how data maps into 
antennas and where to focus energy in space” [4]. The latter attribute, the ability to focus 
energy in space, is vital to endeavors involving LPI/LPD communications.  
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C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis will introduce the scenario/use case in which this 
research was meant to be applied, as well as an attack model used to develop a novel 
user-equipment (UE) side connection process. The classic “Alice/Bob/Eve” construct will 
be used to introduce the scenario and attack model, and system component names will be 
used throughout the detailed discussion of system operations. Through the scenario and 
attack model discussion key parameters and key performance indicators (KPI) are 
developed and subsequently used as the basis for decisions throughout the research. A 
broad overview of the UE-Side Connection Process (UECP) will be presented, followed 
by an in-depth analysis of critical elements and processes used throughout the connection 
process. A step-by-step explanation of performance criteria, analysis process, results, and 
decision point justifications will be provided throughout the document. Lastly, a summary 
and recommendations for follow-on work will be presented.  
  
4 
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II. ATTACK MODEL AND SCENARIO 
This research is not intended to be applied to all 5G NR scenarios. This section is 
intended to clarify the proper use case or application of the novel UECP, as well as detail 
the attack model used to guide the focus of research and criteria for decisions throughout.  
A. MODEL ACTORS AND SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
1. Model Actors 
The scenario/use case and proposed UECP process will be introduced using the 
“Alice/Bob/Eve” construct for clarity purposes. The main actors and what they represent 
are: 
• Eve: Represents non-friendly forces, specifically those passively listening 
in the EM spectrum attempting to detect EM energy. 
• Bob: Represents the g-Node B (gNB) base station used as the central hub 
for 5G NR connectivity for all Alices.  
• Alice: Represent scattered devices (UE) that are connected to Bob, or 
attempting to connect to Bob, and close enough that a connection could be 
successful.  
2. Scenario Overview 
The fundamental scenario is that a wireless connection needs to be established 
between Bob and Alice (Figure 1), but Eve is constantly listening, and if she detects the 
transmissions from either Bob or Alice her ability to geolocate them improves. Neither Bob 
nor Alice is certain of the presence of the other, and both need a means of establishing the 
presence of the other without alerting Eve. 
Eve exists within the environment, but her location is unknown to Bob or Alice. 
Eve is alerted when she detects a signal emanating from either Bob or Alice. There are 
three ways Eve can be successful in detecting Bob or Alice, and they will be discussed in 
a following section. Due to the nature of wireless connections, it is impossible to create a 
6 
perfect connection between Bob and Alice with zero energy going in any undesired 
direction or fully stopping at the recipient; there will always be non-zero energy available 
for Eve to detect. Thus, the goal within the scenario is to establish a directed energy 
connection between Bob and Alice with the least amount of EM energy going in any 
direction not specifically towards Bob or Alice. 
For the remainder of the scenario and attack model discussion, Eve’s interaction 
with Bob will be the focal point; the reason for this will be explained in the UECP Process 
Overview section.  
 
Figure 1. Scenario Overview 
B. EVE CHARACTERISTICS 
Eve’s abilities within the attack model are vital in understanding the direction of 
this research, and the rationale for decisions made throughout the process. The following 
assumed capabilities and limitations were used to both scope the research and guide the 
development of UECP. 
1. Capabilities 
1. Eve’s EM detection is not bounded to any specific region of the spectrum.  
7 
2. Eve can passively detect and capture signals. 
3. Eve can actively transmit signals in the form of a local replay attack, 
where a signal from Alice in the scenario has been captured and is reused 
to try to solicit a response from Bob. 
4. Eve can actively transmit signals in the form of a non-local replay attack, 
where a signal captured previously can be used to deceive Bob or Alice. 
5. Eve can actively transmit signals in the form of a brute force attack, 
wherein randomly constructed signals are used to deceive Bob or Alice. 
6. Eve can be any direction relative to Bob or Alice.  
7. Eve can be at any distance with the exception that Eve will never be closer 
to Bob than any Alice. 
8. Eve does not need to gain access to the underlying information in the 
signal, detection of signal energy from Bob or Alice is sufficient to 
ascertain their physical location.  
9. Eve is passively listening at all times and can transmit at any time.   
10. Eve has complete knowledge of how the systems work, with the exception 
of Limitation 3, below.  
2. Limitations 
1. Eve does not have the ability to establish a connection with Bob. Other 
protocols and safeguards exist outside the scope of this model that would 
prevent Eve from establishing a connection and accessing the network 
Bob is facilitating.  
2. Eve cannot continuously transmit in an attempt to jam either Bob or Alice. 
3. Eve does not have knowledge of the pre-shared key used by Bob and 
Alice.   
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C. EVE’S PATH TO VICTORY 
Eve’s goal within the scenario is to ascertain the physical location of either Bob or 
Alice. The simplest way this would occur would be for Eve to detect signal energy 
emanating from either Bob or Alice. The following paragraphs detail the various ways in 
which Eve can be successful in this endeavor and includes a basic discussion of each.  
1. Passive Detection (Passive Eavesdropping) 
The first path to victory for Eve is to passively detect a signal from either Bob or 
Alice. Inherent in the connection between Bob and Alice is the chance that stray EM energy 
could be detected by Eve; therefore, the likelihood of this occurring can never be reduced 
to zero as long as Alice or Bob is transmitting. However, compared to commercial systems, 
this probability can be greatly reduced while maintaining the ability for Bob and Alice to 
connect and share data. 
2. Solicitation via Random Transmission (Active Eavesdropping) 
The second path to victory for Eve is solicitation through random transmission. By 
using randomly generated transmissions, Eve could conceivably trick Bob or Alice into 
thinking she is a friendly device. This would resemble a brute-force attack, where random 
sequences are generated and transmitted with the desire for a randomly constructed signal 
to be similar enough to a valid signal that either Bob or Alice believes it to be a legitimate 
friendly signal.  Theoretically, exploitation of this path also cannot always be prevented. 
However, steps can be taken to reduce the probability of this path being successful.  
3. Solicitation via Replay Attack 
The final path to victory for Eve is the solicitation of a response from Bob or Alice 
via replay attack. The underlying assumption of this path is that Eve has previously 
captured a signal and is going to use this signal to attempt to solicit a response from either 
a Bob or Alice who believes it to be a friendly solicitation.   
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4. Cyber and Communications Attacks Not Presented 
There are many other common forms of attack on cyber and communications 
systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS), and man-
in-the-middle attacks (MiTM) [5]. The reason DoS and DDoS are not presented as possible 
paths to victory for Eve is that these attacks attempt to degrade the capability of a network. 
Eve’s goal within the scope of the attack model is not degradation, rather, detection of the 
friendly network. These types of attacks are worth exploring in future research but are not 
within the scope of the attack model presented. Another common attack, MiTM, is 
predicated on Eve’s ability to get between Alice and Bob in a digital sense and to 
manipulate or simply observe the traffic flowing between them. For Eve to properly do 
that, she would have already detected the transmissions between Bob and Alice and 
satisfied the conditions for victory through passive detection (Path to Victory #1). Most 
forms of cyber or communications attack require certain levels of integration or access to 
a network that would only occur after the conditions for Eve’s victory have already been 
met.  
D. USE CASE OVERVIEW 
The previous sections established the basic framework and rules for this scenario, 
however, a final important consideration for this research is an understanding of the 
real-world scenario in which it is intended to be used. One major difference between the 
commercial and military applications of 5G NR is that commercial systems are designed 
for the greatest connectivity and coverage possible. In contrast, military applications desire 
the least amount of coverage and connectivity required to perform the required underlying 
network and data transfer functions due to the risks associated with emanating EM energy 
in hostile environments. This research is not intended to apply to large-scale 5G NR 
implementations, and instead focuses on converting small-scale, local area networks 
(LAN) from wired to wireless systems utilizing 5G NR as the fundamental architecture. 
Figure 2 shows a typical military combat operations center (COC) with wired connections 
used for data connectivity between the various devices.  
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Figure 2. Typical Marine Corps Combat Operations Center. Source 
[6]. 
This research focuses specifically on adapting 5G NR to be used as a replacement 
for previously hard-wired connections present in a LAN. The importance of clarifying the 
intended use of this research is that the scope of implementation directly affected decisions 
made throughout this work. This research focuses on a network with a limited number of 
users and devices, a geographically small footprint, and static systems (relative to each 
other). There is not an exact number to each of these constraints, but the suitability of 
UECP diminishes as the number of users grows to the point where connection request 
transmission collisions occur, the geographic separation is great enough that transmit 
power becomes prohibitively high, or that mobility of UEs undermines the accuracy of 
direction of arrival estimates. A simple example of a use case would be a single router 
Wi-Fi and LAN setup, except the router is replaced with a gNB and the background 




With the scenario, attack model, and use case established, there must be an 
investigation into how 5G NR currently operates to understand where risks, opportunities, 
and challenges exist. This section is intended to provide a basic understanding of 5G NR, 
several of its important features, and introduce critical elements and processes to be 
explored later in the work.  
A. 5G NR OVERVIEW 
5G NR is the latest wireless cellular technology standard commercially available 
throughout the world and has marked advantages over previous technologies. The three 
most important advantages and features for this research are its beam-centric design, high 
data rates, and usable spectrum. Beam-centric design is facilitated by multi-antenna arrays 
which allow energy to be directed to a specific location, increasing the spatial separation 
of individual wireless channels [4]. The underlying technology and use of bandwidth in 
5G NR provides for extremely high data rates compared to other wireless technologies [7]. 
Lastly, 5G NR can operate over a wide section of the EM spectrum, and 5G NR has two 
primary frequency ranges; frequency range 1 (FR1) which encompasses all sub-6 GHz 
bands, and frequency range 2 (FR2) which includes 20 GHz to 60 GHz [8]. Additionally, 
5G NR is capable of utilizing frequencies up to 300 GHz [9], which includes the millimeter 
wavelengths (mmWave) frequencies, although it is not currently operating at frequencies 
this high. A detailed analysis of the in-depth workings of 5G NR is beyond the scope of 
this work, however, the three attributes stated above make it a desirable network type for 
military operations and will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.  
B. 5G NR INITIAL ACCESS PROCEDURES 
Although detailed operations associated with 5G NR are beyond the scope of this 
work, understanding the fundamentals of the start of the connection process is essential to 
this research. This process is outlined in this section is adapted summary from ETSI TS 138 
300 V15.8.0 (2020-01) 5G NR Overall Description Stage-2 [10] and RF Wireless World – 
5G NR Initial Access Procedure [11]. 
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Current 5G NR initial access procedure technology uses four steps to establish a 
physical layer connection between a gNB and a UE: beam sweeping, beam measurement, 
beam determination, and UE random-access channel (RACH) response. Beam sweeping 
entails the gNB broadcasting out multiple synchronization signal blocks (SSBs) in 
predetermined directions (Figure 3) at preset time intervals, with each SSB containing a 
primary synchronization signal (PSS) and a secondary synchronization signal (SSS). The 
UEs within the coverage area then receive one or multiple SSBs and perform beam 
measurement which includes analyzing the received SSB(s) to deduce specific 
performance metrics which are then used in beam determination to decide which SSB is 
most suitable for use. The UE then responds to the gNB with a RACH message which starts 
a series of transmissions between the two devices to establish a physical layer connection. 
Figure 4 shows the process in full, however, only the initial SSB process (labeled “PSS/
SSS” in the figure) is relevant to the remainder of this research. 
 
Figure 3. 5G NR SSB Sweep Illustration 
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Figure 4. 5G NR Initial Access Procedures. Source: [11]. 
C. MIMO AND ANTENNA ARRAY INTRODUCTION 
Fundamentally, MIMO refers to the presence of multiple antennas working in 
concert at both the sending and receiving systems. An important feature of 5G NR is the 
utilization of not only MIMO technology but the expansion to massive MIMO, which 
greatly increases the number of antenna elements located at one or both ends of a 
connection. This technology provides a host of advantages: most important to this research 
is the ability of a system to beamform when transmitting [12]. It is important to consider 
the physical limitations of a system based upon application, and array sizes used for 
analysis may not be practical in a real-world scenario. However, a wide range of array sizes 
were used throughout this work to determine if trends existed regardless of specific array 
size.   
Beamforming is the process by which a signal is sent from multiple antennae, but 
each antennae element can modify the signal to increase the energy sent in a specific 
direction, which in turn reduces the energy sent in a different direction. Figure 5 and Figure 
6 illustrate the effects of beamforming. Figure 5 represents a simple omnidirectional 
antenna, and Figure 6 illustrates the impacts of the addition of a second antenna element at 
one-half wavelength distance along the x-axis. The resulting signal pattern shows increased 
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amplitude along the y-axis and no energy along the x-axis. Although the resulting signal is 
running along the y-axis, it is possible to adjust the signal from each antenna to point the 
emitted energy in a specific direction in a process known as beam steering [12].   
 
Figure 5. Omnidirectional Antenna Beam Pattern 
 
Figure 6. 2-Element Array Beam Pattern 
Just as the energy from each element can be adjusted to direct the energy from an 
array to a specific location, the incoming signals can also be adjusted such that the gain in 
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a particular direction is higher than any other direction. Theoretically, if an antenna array 
size were to go to infinity, the energy transmitted could be limited to a single, infinitely 
thin direction in space. The gain when receiving a signal transmitted from that direction 
would also go to infinity. These two attributes, along with the inclusion of massive MIMO 
in 5G NR, constitute major points within this research as they allow energy to be sent to, 
and received from, a single direction, thus reducing stray emissions. If the effects of multi-
path transmissions are also considered, and the number of paths increases, the energy being 
sent and received in any particular direction could be greatly reduced and would converge 
in-phase on a particular point in space. However, the effects of multipath are not included 
in this research due to the earlier-defined scope of the use case.  
D. MILLIMETER WAVE CHARACTERISTICS  
Another important feature of 5G NR is the ability to operate in the mmWave 
portion of the spectrum, which includes the 30 GHz to 300 GHz range [9]. This is an 
important aspect of 5G NR for several reasons. First, the lack of crowding in these 
frequency bands allows for wider spectrum use, thus increasing the data rate capability of 
the systems operating in this range. Second, and most importantly for military use, are the 
propagation characteristics of mmWaves. As a general trend, EM waves experience greater 
attenuation through the atmosphere as the frequency of a signal increases [13]. 
Beyond the general trend, certain areas within the mmWave range experience very 
high attenuation due to atmospheric interaction. Figure 7 shows the attenuation 
characteristics of signals ranging from 1 GHz to 350 GHz and shows several attenuation 
spikes, most notably around 60 GHz. This is an important feature for this research in that 
as the attenuation of a signal increases, the likelihood of detection by adversaries decreases 
as less energy is available for detection at a given distance. The specific regions of high 
attenuation could be exploited to allow the operation of close-range communications 
systems while reducing the detectable distance for those signals. This characteristic will 
not heavily affect the research in this work, as all processes and concepts explored are 
frequency independent. However, it does provide justification for 5G NR use in LPD/LPI 
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scenarios and is a consideration for real-world implementation, especially if frequencies 
above 10 GHz are used.  
 
Figure 7. Attenuation Characteristics of Frequencies between 1 GHz 
and 350 GHz. Source: [13]. 
E. COMBINING THE ATTACK MODEL AND 5G NR 
The attack model is useful in identifying critical areas of vulnerability within the 
current 5G NR processes. In this section, key elements of the attack model and relevant 
5G NR processes are combined and examined to provide the basic framework for the 
remainder of this research.  
1. Eve and 5G NR Initial Access 
5G NR initial access is built upon the concept of providing the largest coverage and 
service to the highest number of users possible. This is facilitated by sending multiple SSBs 
in predetermined directions and using beamforming to increase the strength of each of 
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those signals [7]. This process is immediately identifiable as undesirable when paired with 
the attack model, as it provides a high likelihood of signals being sent directly, or nearly 
directly, from Bob to Eve. This process would need to be modified for a 5G NR system to 
work within the constraints of the attack model. However, it is prudent to minimize 
modification to the 5G NR process as much as possible to reduce the time and resources 
required to modify the base technology for military use. The solution proposed in this 
research is to replace the SSB beam sweeping process with a directed energy approach that 
minimizes the stray emissions caused during the cell search procedure.  
2. Eve and Signal Power 
It is impossible to establish a wireless connection between Bob and Alice without 
any stray emissions. However, it is possible to reduce the energy of all stray emissions by 
reducing the signal power required to establish a connection. This signal energy can be 
reduced in two ways: reducing the duration of a signal and reducing the power of the signal. 
5G NR massive MIMO provides a unique capability in pursuing both objectives. As the 
number of elements in an array increases the gain of the array increases as well. This gain 
allows for the detection of lower power signals and facilitates the use of shorter signal 
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IV. UE-SIDE CONNECTION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
A. HIGH-LEVEL UECP PROCESS FLOW 
The proposed UECP does not interfere with 5G NR initial access procedures and 
instead replaces the SSB broadcast sweep with only a single SSB being transmitted from 
gNB to UE in an intentional direction. Figure 8 shows the previously established 5G NR 
initial access process (in blue text) with the addition of UECP (in red text). 
 
Figure 8. 5G NR Initial Access with UECP. Adapted From [11]. 
Figure 9 provides a process flow and illustration of the fundamental operations of 
UECP. A more detailed, step-by-step analysis of the process is provided in a Section D of 
this chapter.  
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Figure 9. UECP Process Flow 
1. The proposed UECP would require the connection initiation to be done by 
the UE, rather than the gNB. Because neither the UE nor gNB has any 
information as to the direction to the other device, the initial connection 
request needs to be omnidirectional. The reason the connection request 
originates at the UE is because the gNB generally possesses much larger 
antenna arrays than the individual UEs, which provides greater gain when 
detecting the connection request. Although neither device knows the 
direction of an incoming signal, a process described later in this work 
allows the receiving device to scan through a series of possible directions 
of arrival to search if a signal is present. Also, the gain achieved by the 
larger arrays found at the gNB allows for the detection of a signal at lower 
transmit powers than could be achieved by a UE. Additionally, the large 
antenna arrays found at the gNB can more accurately direct a connection 
response to the requesting UE.   
2. The gNB detects the request from the UE. 
3. (a/b) Once the gNB detects the connection request it can use the received 
signal to conduct a direction of arrival estimation to use for the connection 
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response. Additionally, the gNB demodulates and decrypts the connection 
request, and subsequently uses the contained information to verify the 
authenticity of the request before sending a connection reply.   
4. The gNB responds to the UE with a connection reply using the DOA 
estimate determined in step 3a. This response is now directional, thus 
reducing stray emissions. The larger antenna array of the gNB allows for 
tighter response beams which overcome the gain limitations of smaller 
arrays at the UEs which concentrate signal energy in a specific direction to 
overcome the desired reduction in transmitted energy. From this 
connection response, the UE can authenticate the gNB.  
5. gNB responds to UE with SSB and begins standard 5G NR initial access 
procedures.  
B. CONNECTION REQUEST/REPLY DEVELOPMENT 
The goal of a UE-side connection is to reduce stray emissions and the likelihood of 
detection by Eve, which means it is important that the connection request contains just 
enough information that the gNB (Bob) can detect the connection request and authenticate 
both the request and sending UE (Alice). The following sections will detail the various 
ways in which the connection request needs to be modified to increase the likelihood of 
responding to a valid request and reducing the likelihood of responding to an invalid 
request. The “Alice/Bob/Eve” method will be used to explain the connection request 
development process.   
1. Simple Connection  
The simplest type of connection request would be the transmission of a known-
value signal, referred to in this work as a “Hello” message. This process entails Alice 
sending a connection request in the form of an unencrypted “Hello” message to Bob, as 
illustrated in Figure 10. In this case, Eve can easily craft her own “Hello” message and 
solicit a response from Bob, as there is no distinction between the valid and invalid 
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messages from Bob’s perspective. This scenario will be our starting point for how to secure 
the process.  
 
Figure 10. Simple Connection Request Process 
2. Unique Authorization Code and Encryption 
The simple “Hello” scenario demonstrates the need for a secure connection request 
to contain unique information. If we replace a simple “Hello” with an identifier unique to 
Alice, and Eve does not have knowledge of that identifier, then we can reduce the 
likelihood of Eve soliciting a response from Bob (Figure 11). However, if Eve ever 
captures the unique authorization code (AuthCode) for Alice through eavesdropping, she 
can use that code to craft a valid connection request in the future (Figure 12). This means 
protection is required to prevent Eve from being able to easily ascertain the AuthCode 
value. This can be accomplished by encrypting the message with a single pre-shared key 
that is shared by all devices in the scenario. This pre-shared key should not be confused 
with unique, device specific keys generally used in 5G NR connections, and exists only for 
use during this initial connection request.  
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Figure 11. Connection Request Using Unique AuthCode  
 
Figure 12. Eve Capturing AuthCode During Connection Request 
3. Brute Force Attack 
Even if Eve does not obtain a valid AuthCode through eavesdropping, she can 
create one via brute-force methods. This process would involve Eve cycling through 
possible AuthCode values until she randomly encounters a valid value, as seen in Figure 
13. This situation indicates the need for an AuthCode long enough such that the ratio of 
valid values to all possible values is sufficiently low.  
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Figure 13. Eve Brute Force Solicitation Process 
4. Capture of Signal 
If Alice sends out an encrypted solicitation request, and Eve detects she may still 
be able to capture it and use it to craft a valid connection request from Bob’s perspective 
without ever needing to gain access to the unencrypted information (Figure 14). This 
situation indicates the need for a nonce to be included in the connection request. A nonce, 
which is shorthand “a number used only once,” is a number included in a message that 
once received is stored by the receiver. Should that message be captured and reused in a 
replay attack, the recipient can compare the nonce of the replay message to previously 
received nonces to determine if the message is original or the product of a replay attack. 
This nonce prevents Eve from being able to reuse the captured signal to solicit a response 
from Bob. 
However, a nonce alone is not sufficient, as Bob must receive Alice’s original 
message to be able to capture and store the nonce to prevent Eve from being able to reuse 
Alice’s original message. This means that the nonce should be replaced by a time stamp, 
which itself can also act as a nonce. This allows Bob to determine whether that specific 
connection request has been previously received, or if he never received the original 
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request, he could determine when the request was made and whether it falls within an 
acceptable time window (Figure 15).  The use of an accepted time window for connection 
requests requires the systems to be previously time-synchronized.  
 
Figure 14. Eve Captures and Replays Valid Connection Request 
 
Figure 15. Result of Time Stamp Concatenated with AuthCode 
5. Connection Request/Reply Summary 
The preceding section detailed attack methods Eve can use to solicit a response 
from Bob. However, the same methods could be applied to solicit a response from Alice, 
meaning that both a connection request and a connection reply must contain specific 
attributes to prevent Eve from being able to solicit a response from either Bob or Alice. 
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For the solution proposed in this work, a connection request and reply must have four 
distinct properties to decrease the likelihood of Eve being able to solicit a response.  
1. A connection request must use an AuthCode unique to the requesting 
Alice.  
2. A connection request payload must be encrypted to prevent Eve from 
determining valid AuthCodes for future use. 
3. A connection request must be of sufficient length such that Eve cannot be 
successful in soliciting a response via brute-force means. It is important to 
note this length requirement is affected by the use of a time stamp, as the 
smaller a valid time stamp window becomes, the fewer random requests 
can be generated within that window.  
4. A connection request must have a nonce in the form of a time stamp to 
increase protection against replay attacks and increase the difficulty of a 
brute-force attack.  
C. CONNECTION REQUEST/REPLY STRUCTURE 
Figure 16 illustrates the proposed connection request and connection reply 
structure, which consists of two basic elements: the preamble and the payload. The 
preamble is primarily used for detection, synchronization, and DOA estimation, whereas 
the payload is used for authentication. The payload contains three sub-parts: AuthCode, 
time stamp, and error detection and correction (EDAC). Each element of the connection 
request/reply will be discussed in greater detail individually in the subsequent sections.  
 
Figure 16. UECP Connection Request/Reply Structure 
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D. FULL UE-SIDE CONNECTION PROCESS AND CRITICAL PROCESS 
POINTS 
The full UE-side connection process can be seen in Figure 17. Due to the presence 
of various decision points and branch process paths, a successful first-time connection will 
be explained first, and the various outcomes of decision points will be explained after. 
Critical process points are identified with a star in the process diagram and constitute the 
major processes that will be examined in depth later in this work.  
 
 
Figure 17. UECP Full Process Diagram 
A successful first-time connection process would proceed as follows (bolded red 
path in Figure 17): 
1. gNB is manually powered on.  
2. UE is manually powered on. 
3. UE generates and encrypts the payload, which is a concatenation of the 
UE unique AuthCode, time stamp, and EDAC. 
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4. UE generates and encrypts the preamble. 
5. UE generates the connection request which is the concatenation of the 
encrypted preamble and encrypted payload. 
6. UE omnidirectionally transmits the connection request at minimum power.  
7. gNB is passively listening for a connection request. 
8. gNB detects the preamble (Critical process – Detection and 
Synchronization). 
9. gNB finds preamble zero lag location (Critical process – Detection and 
Synchronization). 
10. gNB uses preamble to conduct UE-to-gNB DOA estimation (Critical 
process – Direction of Arrival Estimation).  
11. gNB extracts payload from connection request and uses UE-to-gNB DOA 
estimate to correct the payload (Critical process – Payload Correction).  
12. gNB demodulates payload. 
13. gNB decrypts payload.  
14. gNB verifies request time stamp is within the acceptable time window.  
15. gNB validates UE AuthCode against whitelist. 
16. gNB disables UE AuthCode to reduce likelihood of successful replay 
attacks.  
17. gNB generates a connection reply (same process as UE connection 
request). 
18. gNB transmits connection reply using UE-to-gNB DOA estimate.  
19. UE receives a connection reply and conducts gNB-to-UE DOA estimation. 
20. UE validates the gNB’s AuthCode. 
21. gNB transmits 5G NR SSB using UE-to-gNB DOA estimate and 
transitions to 5G NR initial access process.  
29 
Decision point outcomes (from Figure 17): 
• UE does not receive a connection reply after the first connect request – UE 
increments transmission power and repeats the process. 
• UE fails to receive connection reply after max power connection request 
transmission – UE enters standby until connection process is manually 
reinitiated.  
• gNB does not detect preamble – gNB continues passively listening. 
• Time stamp is not within bound – gNB returns to passive listening.  
• AuthCode validation fails – gNB returns to passive listening.  
1. Detection and Synchronization 
Limiting the power of the incoming signal is not a concern in most wireless signal 
connection methods. However, in this scenario, the greater the energy of the connection 
request, the greater the likelihood of detection by Eve. This problem warranted a new 
approach to detecting and synchronizing signals at very low signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). 
The key to creating an effective method for detection and synchronization without 
increasing transmitted energy involves increasing characteristics of the system that 
increase the likelihood of successful connection without increasing the likelihood of 
detection, such as antenna array size and connection request detection method.  
2. Direction of Arrival Estimation 
Direction of arrival estimation is a critical process in that it serves two purposes 
within UECP: determining response direction, and payload correction. DOA estimation 
involves applying one of several DOA estimation processes to a received signal to ascertain 
the direction from which the signal came. The DOA estimate is then used to steer the 
connection response from the gNB to the UE. The greater the fidelity of the DOA estimate, 
the more precisely the gNB can steer the response signal. This increases the likelihood the 
UE will receive the connection reply while also reducing stray emissions.  
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3. Payload Correction 
The DOA estimate is also used to correct the payload before demodulation. Array 
reception of a signal requires that each element’s received value needs to be 
phase-corrected before demodulation to maximize received gain and reduce the bit error 
rate (BER). This is especially true at very low SNRs where the BER can quickly become 
high enough that information cannot be reliably received.  
E. KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Key performance indicators are developed from previous discussions in this work 
and will be used in the analysis process as the basis for decisions about process elements. 
The key performance indicators are as follows: 
• Probability of detection and synchronization on the preamble. 
• DOA estimation accuracy. 
• BER of payload.  
F. CONSTRAINTS, ASSUMPTIONS, DESIGN SPACE 
As previously stated, this research is only intended to be applied to a specific use 
case consistent with a real-world scenario. Within the scenario and use case certain 
constraints and assumptions exist, along with practical considerations, that must be 
accounted for during analysis and utilization of this process. Additionally, a design space 
is intended to scope the value range of certain key parameters used throughout this 
research.  
1. Constraints 
• The proposed process must be compatible with 5G NR technology, but not 
limited to the current physical systems in use (e.g., array sizes). 
• Process must not disrupt commercial 5G NR processes beyond removing 
the SSB sweep process.  
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2. Assumptions 
• gNB and UE have a pre-shared key for encryption and decryption. 
• There are no multipath effects to consider.  
• Signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR) is negligible.  
• No two connection requests will occur at the same time.  
• Relative motion between the UE and gNB is negligible. 
• gNB and UE internal clocks have previously been synchronized (This is a 
requirement for the utilization of an acceptable time window, but time 
synchronization is not facilitated by UECP.).  
3. Design Space 
• SNR values at the receiver range from -20 dB to 0 dB. 
• DOA values range from -60o to 60o, with 0o representing normal to the 
array.  
• Array analysis is done solely in 2-D. 
• Preambles will be transmitted in binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), and 
payloads will be transmitted in quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK). 
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V. DETECTION AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
A. PURPOSE 
1. Detection of Request 
The detection of a connection request is primarily facilitated by the preamble. The 
gNB will always be passively receiving, matched filtering, and comparing the result to a 
threshold to determine if the expected preamble was detected. Once a request is detected, 
the gNB captures and stores the received signals of both the preamble and payload for later 
operations. 
Many communications systems use unique preambles for each device with low 
cross-correlation characteristics to facilitate the reception and segregation of multiple 
signals simultaneously [14]. Because UECP is only utilized a single time at the initial 
establishment of a connection, a common preamble is shared by all UEs and would not be 
used again unless a new connection needed to be established. With UECP designed to 
support a small number of users, we will assume the likelihood of multiple connection 
requests occurring at precisely the same is negligible. This means the cross-correlation 
properties of a preamble are no longer relevant and having only a single signal used allows 
for detection at lower SNR. 
2. Synchronization for Payload Capture 
One critical element of the process is detecting the center lag location of the 
preamble to ensure the payload is properly captured, demodulated, and decrypted. If the 
connection request is detected but the gNB is not able to properly synchronize with the 
incoming signal both the DOA estimate and payload information will be degraded, with 
the primary concern being the payload degradation since those values are not correlated, 
but rather compared to known values to validate the authenticity of the request.   
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B. SELECTION CRITERIA 
From all previous conversations in this work, certain criteria emerged that are 
relevant to the selection of a preamble.  
1. Low Autocorrelation for Non-Zero Lag 
The need for the gNB to properly synchronize on the connection request means that 
the preamble must have low autocorrelation for non-zero lag. For   
 
 𝑅𝑅[𝑛𝑛] ≜ ⟨𝑥𝑥[𝑚𝑚]𝑥𝑥[𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛𝑛]⟩, (1) 
[ ]R n  must be low at all non-center lag points, where  is the time average over m, which 
ensures that the center lag time sample is clearly identifiable [15]. 
Using a preamble with high autocorrelation for non-zero lag increases the 
likelihood of the gNB orienting on a sample that is not center when additive white Gaussian 
noise (AWGN) is present. This can be seen in Figure 18 where Sequence 1 produces low 
side lobes, and Sequence 2 produces much higher sidelobes. Once AWGN is introduced, 
the higher side lobes in Sequence 2 cause the autocorrelation function (ACF) to exceed the 
given threshold at a point that does not represent full overlap, which would result in the 
payload not being properly captured.  
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Figure 18. ACF Sidelobe Illustration 
2. Length of Preamble 
The longer a preamble is, the greater the processing gain and resilience to the effects 
of AWGN in the receiving system, but this comes at the cost of greater energy being 
emitted into the environment. UECP intends to reduce the amount of stray energy emitted, 
meaning the preamble length should be minimized while still fulfilling its central 
requirement of detection and synchronization.  
3. Predictability 
Although Eve possesses knowledge of how the system works, the presence of a 
pre-shared key means that important information can be obscured from her. Although the 
preamble is not used for UE or gNB authentication, it could be used by Eve to occupy 
critical resources in the gNB and prevent the detection of a valid connection request. 
Although jamming and denial of service (DOS) are not characteristics of the attack model, 
they are worth consideration due to the use case, and reducing the predictability of the 
preamble directly affects the ability of Eve to do either.  
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C. PREAMBLE TYPE PERFORMANCE 
Three sequence types were tested for suitability within UECP: m-sequences, 
Zadoff-Chu (ZC), and randomly generated sequences. M-sequences and ZC sequences are 
two well-known sequence types commonly used as preambles due to their low sidelobe 
levels when autocorrelated [16]. It is worth noting the existence of the Barker sequence, 
which is another sequence type that could be considered for comparison. However, the 
desire for the system to operate at very low SNRs and the Barker sequences being limited 
to a sequence length of only 13 [17] means they are incapable of providing the processing 
gain required to be suitable for UECP.  
1. M-Sequences 
The following section is intended only as an introduction to m-sequences, and a 
more comprehensive and detailed discussion of use and correlation attributes can be found 
in Introduction to Digital Mobile Communications by Yoshihiko Akaiwa [18].  
M-sequences are recursive binary sequences generated using linear feedback shift 
registers and are often used as preambles in communications systems due to the low 
sidelobe levels of the ACF. This behavior can be seen in Figure 19 with an 15N =  
m-sequence. 
Additionally, the normalized periodic ACF, when multiple m-sequences are sent in 
succession, exhibits a very specific behavior wherein the correlation value at full overlap 
is  
 
1         if 0









where n represents lag and N is the total length of the sequence. This attribute can be seen 
for an 15N =  m-sequence in Figure 20. The resulting ACF is a very clear correlation 
profile in the receiving system but requires multiple sequences to be transmitted in 
succession, increasing the overall signal energy, an attribute not desirable for UECP.  
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A different approach would be to expand the matched filter impulse response to be 
a periodic m-sequence, however expanding the filter size increases the noise energy within 
the system, which is also not desirable due to the desire for UECP to function at low SNRs.  
 
Figure 19. Autocorrelation of Single Period M-Sequence 
 
Figure 20. Autocorrelation of Periodic M-Sequence 
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2. Zadoff-Chu Sequences 
This section is again intended only as an introduction to ZC sequences, and further 
discussion concerning the mathematics and application of ZC sequences can be found in 
Preamble Detection Based on Cyclic Features of Zadoff-Chu Sequences for Underwater 
Acoustic Communications by Qinyuan Tan and Yiyin Wang [19]. 
ZC sequences are another sequence type commonly used as preambles for 
communications systems due to low autocorrelation and periodic behavior of the sequence 
when a matched filter is used. The primary difference between ZC and m-sequences is that 
ZC utilizes complex values which result in a zero value at all points outside full overlap. 
The autocorrelation of a 15N =  ZC sequence can be seen in Figure 21. The periodic 
correlation value (when multiple sequences are sent in succession) is 
 
1         if 0
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where n represents lag and N is the total length of the sequence. The periodic response 
behavior of an 15N =  ZC sequence can be seen in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 21. Autocorrelation of Single Period ZC-Sequence 
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Figure 22. Autocorrelation of Periodic ZC-Sequence 
3. Random Sequences 
The final sequence type to be tested is a random binary sequence. The reason a 
random binary sequence is being examined is that it would allow a set preamble sequence 
to be masked using a single pre-shared key across all devices. Eve would need to capture 
the preamble encrypted with the pre-shared key before being able to falsify a detection 
within the gNB, and that captured preamble would only be valid for the duration of the 
time the pre-shared key is valid. Random sequences do not possess the same attributes of 
the m-sequences or ZC sequences. Generally, they do not possess low sidelobes when 
autocorrelated, as seen in Figure 23.  
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Figure 23. Autocorrelation Random Sequence (1 Realization) 
Additionally, randomly generated sequences generally do not have low 
cross-correlation characteristics and do not exhibit an ideal behavior when periodically 
correlated (Figure 24). However, the two later characteristics, cross-correlation, and 
periodic correlation, are not of great concern since we assumed probability of simultaneous 
requests is low, and periodic correlation response requires multiple sequence transmissions 
which are not desired for our system. The critical point in analyzing the suitability of using 
a random sequence is determining the impacts of higher side lobes on the ability of the 




Figure 24. Autocorrelation of Periodic Version of Random Sequence 
(1 Realization) 
D. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON OF SEQUENCE TYPES 
1. Process and Simulation Explanation 
The analysis of preamble types was done using a simulation built within MATLAB, 
and testing was done utilizing Monte Carlo simulations. Figure 25 shows the process flow 




Figure 25. Preamble Testing Simulation Process 
1. Sequence Generation: Depending on the type of sequence being tested, an 
m-sequence, ZC sequence, or random sequence was generated which will 
be expressed as y . 
2. Matched Filter: The generated sequence from Step 1 was then stored for 
use as a matched filter impulse response during detection. The impulse 
response is the sequence reversed in time and can be expressed 
as n N nh y −= .  
3. Zero Padding Added: Because the matched filter correlation against noise 
would have an impact at all points outside full signal and matched filter 
overlap, the system needed to simulate and capture that behavior. To 
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accurately represent that situation, zero padding of length equal to the 
sequence was added to both the front and the back of the generated 
sequence. This padding provided a realistic scenario where the matched 
filter would be correlated against noise only, as well as a preamble signal 
with the addition of noise. Since this process only occurs a single time, 
and a preamble will not always be present, it was important to determine 
the system characteristics with only noise present. The result of this step is 
the creation of 'y , which is the concatenation of zero padding, y , and 
zero padding.  
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where 2nσ  represents the noise variance, SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio of 
the given iteration in dB, and sP  is the signal power (which was held at 1 
throughout all testing). The complex noise was then added to the original 
zero padded signal to produce 'x y noise= + . SNR was varied throughout 
the series of simulations 
5. Correlate Against Matched Filter: The matched filter impulse response 
saved in Step 2 was then convolved with the padded, noisy signal denoted 
as x. This correlation was computed using     
1
0
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= − ≥∑ ,          (5) 
where N is the total signal length, x is the noisy signal, and h is the matched 
filter’s impulse response. 
6. Threshold Testing: A hypothesis test was applied to the correlation values 
produced in Step 6 to find all locations where ( )xhR i exceeded a threshold. 

















where 0 Hγ is no signal present, 1Hγ  is signal present, and γ represents the 
threshold value used. Because the outputs of this simulation were the 
probability of detection ( DP ) and probability of false alarm ( FAP ) in the form 
of a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, the γ value was varied 
through the iterations. 
7. Detect or False Alarm Determination: A second hypothesis test was 
applied to all values meeting the 1Hγ  test from Step 6. This was used to 
determine if the 1Hγ  value occurred only at the full overlap of the 
preamble and matched filter, which would mean the signal was both 














where i  represents the location(s) of 1Hγ  found in Step 6, 0SH  represents 
synchronization did not occur, 1SH  represents synchronization did occur, 
and m is the power of 2 used to create the original sequence length. This 
hypothesis test is not standard and applies only to the specific location of 
full overlap between signal and matched filter impulse response as designed 
in this simulation.    
8. Zero All Computed Values, Repeat Loop/Store Calculated Data: This step 
involved two separate processes, saving relevant computed values, then 
clearing all computed values to prepare for the next iteration of the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The values stored were the computed number of 
detections and false alarms, all others were cleared, and the only values 
held for the next iteration were the original sequence, matched filter 
impulse response, SNR, and γ  values.  
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9. Final Values: This MC simulation was nested within multiple for loops 
within MATLAB to allow for multiple SNR and γ  combinations to be 
tested to fully define the ROC curves. At the conclusion of each MC 
simulation the relevant values from each iteration were combined to 
determine the final values for each SNR γ− combination.  
10. Estimate DP  and FAP  Values: At the conclusion of each SNR γ−
combination, the sum of all detects and false alarms were used, along with 
all possible detect and false alarm opportunities to produce the DP  and FAP



























where D represents whether a detect occurred (a value of 1 for yes and a 
value of 0 for no), AF  represents if false alarms occurred (again, a value of 
1 for yes and a value of 0 for no) on any given Monte Carlo iteration, and 
M is the number of Monte Carlo simulations conducted for a given SNR γ−
combination. Each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation contained only 
a single opportunity for detection (detection, in this case, is defined as the 
combination of detection and synchronization), and a variable number of 
false alarm opportunities depending on the original sequence length. For 
any single iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, there existed 2(2m)-1 
possible false alarms, with the -1 value in the denominator of Equation 9 
accounting for the single valid detection location. This value is then scaled 
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by the total number of Monte Carlo iterations for a given SNR γ−  
combination to determine total false alarm opportunities. 
2. Probability of detection and Synchronization Results 
Although Monte Carlo simulations were run for SNR values between -20 dB and 
0 dB, at 5 dB increments, with sequence lengths (SL) of 2m-1 with [3,7]m = , and many 
plots created and studied, only a select number will be contained within this report. These 
plots are specifically chosen to demonstrate trends and illustrate important points that were 
discovered. The plots not contained in this work show the same behavioral trends and 
reinforced what will be discussed.  
Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the ROC curves at 0SNR =  dB, at two distinct SLs, 
7 (Figure 26), and 127 (Figure 27). Several important observations can be seen between 
these two figures. First, as SL is increased, the processing gain results in improved ROC. 
This is the expected outcome as the increase in SL results in increased processing gain 
within the system, thus reducing the impact noise has on the detection process. The second 
major observation is that the ROC characteristics among all three sequence types are 
relatively consistent, with m-sequences showing a slight decrease in performance 
compared to the other two. This disparity, however, does not hold consistent as the SNR 
value decreases, as will be seen in the next set of plots.  
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Figure 26. ROC Curve, SNR = 0 dB, SL = 7 
 
Figure 27. ROC Curve, SNR = 0 dB, SL = 127 
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Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the results of the simulation when SNR is decreased 
to -20 dB, with the SLs remaining at 7 and 127. There are several major points worth 
discussing between these two plots. First, as SNR decreases, the ROC decreases. As Figure 
28 shows, with an SL of 7, detection becomes arbitrary. However, if we increase the SL, 
and thus increase processing gain, the ROC increases as well, as seen in Figure 29. The 
reason this is important to this research is that the impact of increasing SL is an increase in 
signal energy, thus increasing the likelihood of detection of the signal. 
The second major point from these figures is that as SNR decreases, the 
performance variation between each sequence type becomes negligible. The results of the 
comparison between sequence types, specifically the performance of a random sequence 
compared to m-sequences and ZC sequences in this use case were not expected. This lack 
of performance separation warranted additional analysis.  
 
Figure 28. ROC Curve, SNR = -20 dB, SL = 7 
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Figure 29. ROC Curve, SNR = -20 dB, SL = 127 
3. Parity Between Sequence Types 
As seen in the last section, all sequence types showed essentially equal performance 
as SNR decreased from 0 dB to -20 dB. This was not the expected result, and as such, 
warranted additional analysis to ensure the results were accurate. The first thing to consider 
is the autocorrelation results and sidelobes present from each sequence type. ZC and 
m-sequences are specifically designed to exhibit low side lobes in autocorrelation [16], 
whereas random sequences possess no such characteristic. Each random sequence will 
have its own sidelobe profile. Figure 30 shows the autocorrelation results of a random 
sequence, m-sequence, and ZC sequence. This particular randomly generated sequence 
shows two dominant side lobes, which, in the presence of noise, should decrease the 
likelihood of proper detection and synchronization. However, this illustrates only a single 
realization of a random sequence. 
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Figure 30. Autocorrelation Values of Various Sequence Types 
To better understand the sidelobe behavior of a random sequence, and for 
illustrative purposes, a thousand realizations of random sequences of length 1023 
( 1023SL = ) were created and autocorrelated, then compared to the autocorrelation results 
of both ZC and m-sequences. Figure 31 shows the result of that study and several important 
things were discovered.  
First, although ZC sequences generally result in very low correlation values, large 
sidelobes exist periodically. These large sidelobes present an opportunity for false alarms, 
and when this particular sequence was run through the detection simulation the result of 
these sidelobes was clearly visible in the ROC separation between the m-sequence and ZC 
sequence (Figure 32).  
The second observation from Figure 31 is that although random sequences have 
higher sidelobes than an m-sequence, this plot is effectively showing the maximum 
sidelobe correlation values of the thousand random sequences in black, and not 
representative of the behavior of a single iteration.   
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Figure 31. Combined Results of 1000 Random Sequence 
Autocorrelations 
  
Figure 32. Impacts of Large ZC Sequence Sidelobes on ROC 
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What becomes clear is that two factors can cause one sequence to perform worse 
than another. The first, discussed previously, is the presence of unusually high sidelobes, 
which increases the likelihood that a specific location will cause a false alarm. The second 
is that the mean of the sidelobes of one sequence is greater than the mean of another, which 
would increase the likelihood of any random point causing a false alarm.  
To better understand how the mean of the sidelobes would affect performance an 
additional simulation was conducted that measured the mean sidelobe level of each 
sequence, using one thousand realizations of each sequence’s autocorrelation results. 
Figure 33 clearly shows a separation between the means of each sequence’s autocorrelation 
values, but this separation cannot be used to draw a definitive conclusion about 
performance. Rather, mean separation compared to noise present is needed to determine 
performance. Figure 33 shows that at 0SNR =  dB there should be some performance 
difference, but with a mean value separation of less than 0.005, it is unlikely to be captured 
in the ROC curve unless the discrete   values reach that granularity (which they did not 
in this simulation).  Additionally, when the same study was conducted with 20SNR = −  dB, 
it becomes clear the mean value separation is far less than the variance caused by noise 
within the system (Figure 34).  
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Figure 33. Autocorrelation Mean Values for Various Sequence Types 
(SNR = 0 dB) 
  
Figure 34. Autocorrelation Mean Values for Various Sequence Types 
(SNR = -20 dB) 
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E. DETECTION AND SYNCHRONIZATION CONCLUSION 
The major results from this section are performance differences between random, 
ZC, and m-sequence types exist at higher SNRs, but as SNR decreases the performance 
difference becomes negligible. Because there are a limited number of ZC and m-sequences 
at a given SL, choosing either would make it easier for Eve to predict the specific sequence 
the UE or gNB is using and engage in coherent detection to improve her chances of 
detecting an omnidirectional connection request. Additionally, the use of a random 
sequence would allow the UE to encrypt a set preamble with a pre-shared key that changes 
periodically, thus randomizing the preamble structure with every new key used, preventing 
Eve from capturing it and using it indefinitely for either coherent detection or to craft a 
solicitation request. Because of these reasons, random sequences were chosen as the 
preamble sequence type for UECP analysis.  
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VI. PASSIVE ARRAY SWEEP LISTENING 
A. PASSIVE ARRAY SWEEP LISTENING INTRODUCTION 
The previous section simulated only a single antenna for analysis, but 5G NR 
wireless operations are facilitated primarily by antenna arrays [7]. Antenna arrays, as 
previously mentioned in this work, enable beamforming which increases the energy sent 
in a particular direction compared to others [20]. Although antenna arrays cannot increase 
the energy gained from a particular direction, they can combine the energy received at 
every antenna element in a way that increases the processing gain from a particular 
direction.  
1. Array Gain Mathematics 
Array gain allows antennas with multiple elements to increase the energy sent in a 
particular direction or to allow better reception of signals coming from a particular 
direction. To explore this further, we will look at the fundamentals of how array gain works. 
This section is not intended to be a full analysis of antenna array mathematics. All equations 
below, and more comprehensive derivations and analysis can be found in Fundamentals of 
Applied Electromagnetics – Seventh Edition [20]. 
Starting with a linear antenna array with equally spaced elements transmitting from 
all elements with uniform amplitude and phase, the array factor (AF), which represents the 
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and N  represents the number of antenna array elements, d  is element spacing, λ  is the 
wavelength, and θ  is the angle of arrival/departure in radians (
2
πθ =  represents 
broadside). If we assume equal element spacing, 
2
d λ=  (an assumption used for the 
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where Equation 13 is the normalized array factor.  
A plot of Equation 13 (Figure 35) illustrates the impacts of increasing the number 
of antenna elements by showing the gain pattern for 4,  16,  and 64N = .  
 
Figure 35. Antenna Array Gain Patterns for Various Array Sizes 
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As the number of antenna elements increases the half-power beamwidth (HPBW) 
decreases, the relative magnitude of the side lobes decreases, and the side lobe departure 
angles close around the main lobe. This phenomenon is good for this research for two 
reasons. First, the narrower the main lobe the greater the proportion of the transmitted 
energy directed at the receiving device, meaning less energy is required for the transmitted 
signal to be properly detected. Second, the magnitude and direction of the side lobes 
heavily affect the amount of energy classified as stray emissions in the connection process.  
2. The Impacts of Massive MIMO 
The previous section discussed the basics of array gain using smaller array sizes. 
Figure 36 clearly illustrates the impact if antenna array sizes are greatly increased by 
showing the gain pattern of an 512N =  array. An array of this size may not be practical at 
current 5G NR frequencies in FR1 or FR2 due to the spacing required for antenna elements 
(
2
d λ= ). However, as higher frequencies are utilized, the number of elements present in 
the same physical size array will increase linearly, allowing for much larger array sizes.  
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Figure 36. Gain Pattern of N = 512 Array 
3. Electronic Scanning 
The previous section showed the impacts of array sizes using uniform amplitude 
and phase at all antenna elements. However, the result of those constraints is that the main 
lobe will always be broadside to the array, that is, perpendicular to the face of the array. If 
the equal phase at all elements constraint is removed the array can steer the emitted energy 
in a specific direction. As before, only the equations relevant to this research are going to 
be presented, and more detailed mathematics and derivations can be found in 
Fundamentals of Applied Electromagnetics – Seventh Edition [20]. 
If the phase at all elements is not equal, Equation 11 is replaced by 'γ , which is  
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 and Equation 13 becomes
2
2 2
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=  (16) 
where oθ is the angle of departure for the main lobe (in radians), also referred to as the scan 
angle.  
Figure 37 illustrates the effects of applying a scan angle to the array and shows the 
main lobe moving to the scan angle location. Notice that HPBW increases as the scan angle 
moves from broadside to endfire (the significance of this will be discussed later).  
 
Figure 37. Effects of Scan Angle on Main Lobe HPBW 
The previous equations showed the outgoing effects of applying a scan angle, but 
we also must understand how the array achieves gain on the receiving side. Figure 38 shows 
a uniform linear array of length N receiving an incident signal, ps .  
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Figure 38. Uniform Linear Array with Incidental Signal 
If the incident signal arrival direction, pθ , is known, the signal received by the kth 
element at time t, ( )kr t , is  





= , (18) 
and kD represents the time delay between when the zeroth element receives the signal and 
when the kth element receives it, which can also be regarded as a phase shift between the 
received signals.   
The previous equations can be used to define the signal received at each element 
given a known signal and known direction of arrival. However, it is possible to utilize these 
relationships to determine the direction of arrival of a signal given the signal values are 
known in advance. 
B. PASSIVE ARRAY SWEEP LISTENING PROCESS 
Just as increasing a known signal’s length can increase processing gain, should the 
direction of arrival be known, increasing the number of antenna elements can also increase 
the gain of the receiving system, as seen in Equation 12. In our scenario, the initial 
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connection request is not coming from a known direction. There are various methods used 
to determine the received signal’s DOA, and one of the most commonly used algorithms 
is Multiple User Signal Classification (MUSIC) [21]. MUSIC proved to be inadequate for 
this application, which will be explored in greater depth later in this work. The problem 
currently needing to be addressed is how to maximize array gain without a known direction 
of arrival. This challenge led to the development of the passive array sweep listening 
(PASL) method in this research. PASL applies multiple fundamental concepts to maximize 
the ability of a passively listening array to capture a known signal from an unknown 
location. The key to PASL is that the signal being received must be known in advance to 
allow for matched filtering.  
1. PASL Process and Mathematics 
Referencing back to Figure 38, an incident signal, ps , is arriving at some angle off 
broadside, which will be used to explain the PASL process. Given the discrete incident 
signal ps , the received signal, ignoring the presence of noise, can be characterized by the 
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where ( , )pa kθ are the individual steering values at each array element for the signal (the 
combination of all is referred to the steering array), N is the total number of antenna 
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elements, and S is the total signal length. Notice that in the shift to discrete time the t 
variable from Equation 17 is replaced with nT where n is discrete time and T is the sample 
interval.  
Next, the receiving system applies a series of unsteering vectors to the rR  matrix 
column-by-column. That is, it applies a steering vector intended to undo the effects of the 
original steering angle. This is accomplished using 
  ( ) [ ] ( )     for =0,1,2... -1
uu s r s


































and [ ]r nr  is the nth column of the rR matrix, and ( )u sθ θa  is the unsteering vector at each 
sθ  value used. The result, ( )u sθr , is a vector of unsteered signal values at every discrete 
sθ  used. As sθ  runs through the full range of possible values, the closer sθ  gets to the 
original incident angle, pθ , the closer each element of the ( )u sθr  vector will get to the 
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which results in a single scalar value, m, for every discrete θs value. As sθ  approaches pθ , 
the value of m approaches a maximum possible value. Although the true maximum occurs 
when s pθ θ=  the discrete nature of sθ  means it is unlikely ( )sm θ  will ever truly match 
the summed absolute value of ps  . Once the maximum ( )sm θ  is found, the corresponding 
sθ  can be captured and will be referred to as maxsθ −  for the remainder of this work.  
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Although the previous mathematics work to determine the θs value where the 
largest signal value occurred, it does not consider whether a valid signal is present. Noise 
alone would always result in a maximum m value being found, and thus a maxsθ −  value, 
regardless of whether a signal was present.  
To use this method fully in determining the presence of a signal, we need to use the 
maxsθ − value found to unsteer the received signal and correlate against the matched filter. 
This is done using 
 maxmax
[ ] ( )






r , (24) 
where N is the number of antenna elements and is used in the denominator to scale the 
resulting maxr  value. The process explained in Chapter V.D.1 of this work is then applied 
to the resulting maxr vector to determine whether a preamble is present.  
It is important to note that N in Chapter V refers to sequence length, not to be 
confused with N referencing array length in this chapter. Due to the concepts and topics 
being discussed in this work some confusion can arise as certain variables are commonly 
used across multiple fields of study and can mean very different things based on context. 
The variables used previously in this work were intended to align with the larger body of 
work in that particular field. However, the remainder of this work involves a combination 
of concepts that could cause such crossovers to become increasingly confusing. To prevent 
this, two new variables are used for the remainder of this work; the length of a signal is 
represented by SL, and the length of an array is represented by EL. It is important to be able 
to distinguish between these two variables as the central theme of this work is the trade 
space between them during the connection process.    
2. PASL Sweep Angle Step Size 
Now that the PASL process mathematics are established, this process can be 
applied to the specific scenario presented in this work. As seen previously in Figure 26 
through Figure 29, the detection and synchronization capability of the system drops rapidly 
as SNR decreases when only a single antenna is used. However, the PASL process allows 
64 
for much greater performance by utilizing the signals at all antenna elements in the array 
for detection and synchronization. Because AWGN is zero mean, as the number of 
antennas approached infinity, the sum of the noise would approach zero, leaving the 
received signal value as the dominant value. 
Before that can be shown, it is important to consider some practical aspects of the 
PASL process. Observing Equation 22, the sθ  value is presented as continuous, but this is 
computationally impossible. The sθ  value must be broken up into discrete values in the 
computation process, and if the sθ  step size ( sθ∆ ) is too large, we may fail to get close 
enough to the true pθ  value to result in maxr  producing a correlation value high enough for 
detection. Because the PASL process must be conducted with every new sample received, 
if the discrete sθ∆  values are too granular, the computation time required becomes too great 
to be practical for a real-world system. 
The starting point for determining the optimum sθ∆  is to examine fundamental 
array gain mechanics. Figure 39 illustrates the beam pattern for two separate arrays, one 
with 4EL = and the other with 8EL = .  
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Figure 39. Beam Patterns for 4EL =  and 8EL = Arrays 
Notice that as the number of antenna elements (EL) increases, the HPBW decreases. 
This is a good starting point to determine a sθ∆  required to properly capture the incoming 
signal. If the sθ∆  is larger than the HPBW, it has a chance of bypassing the main lobe of 
the received signal completely; if it is too small the computational time required becomes 
prohibitive. We now see that sθ∆  must be less than the HPBW of the array itself, which is 








≈ , (25) 
where EL is the number of antenna elements, oθ  is the scan angle in radians ( 0oθ =  
represents normal or broadside to the array), and d is the element spacing, we can 





= , the HPBW becomes independent of frequency. Figure 40 illustrates the HPBW 
approximation through the range of values important to this research (+/- 60o).  
  
Figure 40. HPBW at Various Array Sizes (+/- 60o Scan Angle) 
The reason this is an approximation is that it is valid at broadside, but less accurate 
as o  approaches endfire. For the purposes of this research, this approximation is 
acceptable since the HPBW increases as the signal angle approaches endfire, and the goal 
is to ensure the s  is granular enough that it will not bypass the HPBW. If s is built off 
a zero probability of missing the main lobe at broadside (0o), then the probability of it 
missing the main lobe anywhere else is also zero. 
The first set of analyses on the PASL process involved identifying the ideal step 
size for θs. To do this the PASL process was tested using the same process found in the 
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Preamble Process and Simulation Explanation found in Chapter V, using a random 
sequence and random arrival angle, with the inclusion of PASL between Steps 4 and 5. 
Note that for this analysis an array size of 8192 was used. Although this array size is not 
necessarily physically practical for small, mobile systems, it is used throughout this work 
as an upper theoretical bound for array length.  
Figure 41 through Figure 46 illustrate the resultant ROC curves from a series 
simulation runs with 2SL = , 8192EL = , 30SNR = −  dB, and the only variable was sθ∆  
step size (as annotated on each plot). The three curves displayed are Array PASL, Array 
No PASL, and Single Element. Array PASL is the ROC curve resulting from an antenna 
array utilizing the PASL method described previously. Array No PASL is the ROC curve 
resulting from an array where PASL is not used, thus no direction of arrival estimation is 
performed and the received signal is merely the summation of incident signals at each 
element (Equation 21 with the 
uθ
a  vector set to all ones). Single Element is the ROC curve 
produced if only a single antenna element was receiving the signal.  
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Figure 41. ROC Curves: 4( )s HPBWθ∆ =  
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Figure 42. ROC Curves: 2( )s HPBWθ∆ =  
 
Figure 43. ROC Curves: s HPBWθ∆ =  
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Figure 44. ROC Curves: ( / 2)s HPBWθ∆ =  
 
Figure 45. ROC Curves: ( / 4)s HPBWθ∆ =  
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Figure 46. ROC Curves: ( /10)s HPBWθ∆ =  
As can be seen in Figure 41 through Figure 43, the ability of the receiving system 
to detect and synchronize with the incoming preamble increase greatly as sθ∆  approaches 
the value of the HPBW. However, once sθ∆  equals ½ HPBW, the improvement achieved 
in the ROC curves by further reducing sθ∆  becomes negligible. The PASL process is 
computationally taxing, and the amount of discrete sweep angles is equal to 120
sθ∆
, meaning 
a decrease in step size is inversely proportional to the number of calculations required. The 
gains realized below ( / 2)s HPBWθ∆ =  are not sufficient to justify the additional 
computational power required. Additionally, as is seen in Figure 41 through Figure 46, the 
application of the PASL method results in detection and synchronization performance that 
greatly exceeds the ability of a single antenna element or an array that is not conducting 
direction of arrival estimation.   
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3. Detection and Synchronization Performance Analysis 
As illustrated and explained in the previous section, the PASL method can detect 
and synchronize with signals at far lower SNRs than a single antenna, or an array that does 
not estimate the direction of arrival of a signal. The key concept central to the capability of 
the PASL process is that the AWGN at each element is independent and identically 
distributed (IID) with a zero mean. This means as the number of array elements approached 
infinity, the average noise across all antenna elements would approach zero, leaving only 
the signal present. The same is true if we were to use a single antenna and a single-valued 
preamble of infinite length. Generally, increasing signal length is used to improve system 
performance as SNR decreases, but results in more EM energy emitted into the 
environment. By utilizing larger arrays, we can gain a similar benefit without violating a 
main tenant of this research, which is reducing EM energy emitted. 
The first step in determining the performance of the PASL method is to define 
certain required performance characteristics. Figure 47 illustrates an ideal ROC curve 
(perfect classifier), where DP  is equal to 1 when FAP  is equal to zero, along with an arbitrary 
ROC curve (random classifier), where the likelihood of detection and false alarm are equal 
at any given threshold.  
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Figure 47. ROC Curve Types 
Because the ROC curves for any given signal length, SL, number of antenna 
elements, EL, and SNR are different, a method of comparison was required to ascertain the 
performance of the system. One such method is to calculate the area under the ROC curve, 
where an area of 1 represents a perfect classifier and an area of 0.5 represents a random 
classifier. This method is achieved by using a right-hand Reimann sum [22]  of the ROC 
curve. A right-hand Reimann sum was used because it provides a more conservative 
estimate of the area under the curve. Figure 48 illustrates the Riemann sum used and the 
equation (adapted from [22]) is  
1
1
( 1)( ( ) ( 1))
R
ROC D FA FA
n
A P n P n P n
−
=
= + − + ,       (26) 
where R represents the total number of DP  and FAP  values computed, which is based on 
the amount of discrete threshold values used. The ROCA term constitutes the area under the 
ROC curve for a given set of parameters.  
74 
 
Figure 48. Riemann Sum of ROC Curves 
Additionally, because the threshold values used start at zero and end at infinity, the 
first DP  and FAP  values start at (1,1) at a threshold of zero, and end at (0,0) at a threshold 
of infinity. This means the curve is progressing from right to left on the plot in Figure 48 
as the threshold value rises, meaning the ( )1n +  value seen in Equation 26 represents a 
point lower on the curve than n , making this a more conservative estimate of the area 
under the ROC curve. Now that a method has been established to characterize the 
performance of the system with any given set of parameters, an analysis of the PASL 
method’s performance can be completed. 
4. PASL Simulation 
Figure 49 shows the simulation process used to analyze the performance of the 
PASL process. Outside a few modifications noted below Figure 49, this simulation mirrors 
that of the preamble testing simulation. 
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Figure 49. PASL Simulation Process 
The first major change from the preamble simulation is the inclusion of a steering 
vector at Step 4, which is used in conjunction with a randomly generated DOA and steering 
vector based on EL to create the signal which will arrive at each antenna element. The other 
major modification is that the final output (Step 12) is no longer a ROC curve. Rather, it is 
the area under the ROC curve ( ROCA ), which provides a numerical expression of the 
performance of the system.    
5. PASL Applied to Detection and Synchronization 
Table 1 shows the series of variables and range of values used to conduct the Monte 
Carlo simulations resulting in a total of 756 unique SNR-SL-EL simulation configurations 
with each configuration run one thousand times.  
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Table 1. PASL Monte Carlo Parameters 
Variable Min Max Step Size 
SNR (dB) -20 0 1 
Sequence Length (SL) 4 128 2m    m= [2,7] 
Array Elements (EL) 4 128 2m    m= [2,7] 
Threshold 0 Infinity Variable 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.9 (90%) 0.999 (99.9%) Variable 
 
It is also important to introduce a new term at this time, effective sequence length 
(ESL), which is  
( )ESL SL EL= ,         (27) 
where SL is the sequence length (preamble length in this case) and EL is the number of 
array elements. This term is important for characterizing the performance of the PASL 
system independent of the specific values of SL or EL, but only as a product of the 
combination of the two terms. If we determine the system operates with sufficient 
performance at an ESL of 1000, then any possible combination of EL and SL that result in 
an ESL of 1000 should perform the same. This is important because we are examining the 
trade space between signal length (which corresponds to the amount of energy emitted) 
and antenna array sizes. This concept, along with some limitations that exist with it, will 
be explored in greater detail later in this work.    
The results of the comprehensive Monte Carlo simulation can be seen in Figure 50. 
It is important to note that the vertical axis scale of this plot is logarithmic and represents 
the product of the SL and EL terms (or ESL) for any given Monte Carlo simulation. 
77 
 
Figure 50. ESLs Required for Discrete ROCA Performance Levels at 
Various SNRs  
The curves of this plot show the ESL required to produce a ROC curve that captures 
a percentage of the total possible ROC curve area. The 90% line, for instance, equates to 
an ROCA  of 0.9, or 90% of the area value of a perfect identifier, which has an ROCA  equal 
to 1. As expected, larger ESL values are required to have better ROCs at any single SNR 
value, which is why the required ESL is higher for higher ROCA  percentages. The stairstep 
pattern of the graph is a byproduct of the discrete values used for the simulation, which 
also means the curves in Figure 50 do not represent the exact ESL values required at any 
given SNR and are better thought of as an upper bound. Figure 51 shows an expanded view 
of Figure 50, isolating the -5 dB to 0 dB SNR range, and the 32 to 256 ESL region.  
78 
 
Figure 51. Expanded ESL vs. SNR Curves 
Three points are annotated on this plot and show that for the ROC curve to capture 
99.9% of the perfect identifier area at SNRs of -2 dB, -3 dB, and -4 dB, the ESL required is 
64, 128, and 256, respectively. What can be identified from this plot is that at -4 dB it takes 
an ESL of no more than 256 for the ROC curve to capture 99.9% of the total perfect 
classifier area. What cannot be identified is precisely how low the ESL could be and still 
produce the required performance. However, we can see that at an SNR of -3 dB, an ESL 
of 128 was required, but an ESL of 128 was not sufficient to maintain the 99.9% 
performance at -4 dB. This means the true ESL required exists somewhere above 128 and 
at or below 256. This creates a region of ambiguity, but bounds the ESL required to achieve 




Figure 52. ESL vs. SNR Curves - Ambiguity Region 
The primary intent of this analysis was to determine what the required ESL would 
be at a particular SNR value and determine if the ESL growth is steady as SNR drops. 
Referring to Figure 50, the curves show some irregularity above -14 dB but stabilize and 
grow consistently below -14 dB and can be characterized by the approximation equations  
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The trendlines created with Equations 28 through 31 can be seen in Figure 53, and 
show that they are the high-end approximations for the required ESL, meaning lesser values 
may work, but the approximations are conservative enough to ensure the system works at 
the desired SNR and performance level.    
 
Figure 53. ESL Trendlines 
Although Equations 28 through 31 accurately characterize the performance of the 
system below -14 dB, more analysis was required to understand why the system behavior 
was not as consistent when SNR was greater than -14 dB. The same data used to create 
Figure 50 was used again to better understand the interaction between the SL and EL values. 
Figure 54 shows the system behavior at 0.999ROCA =  when one parameter (either SL or 
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EL) was locked into a set value, and the other parameter varied throughout the full range 
of possible values found in Table 1. 
 
Figure 54. ESL Parameter Isolation 
The four plots in Figure 54 represent four separate possible parameter values that 
were used to make either SL or EL a static value while the other parameter was varied. For 
instance, Figure 54: Subplot A illustrates the system performance between -14 dB and 0 dB 
when either the EL or SL value was locked at 16, and the other parameter varied between 
4 and 128. Figure 54: Subplot A shows that at an SNR value of 0 dB, with an EL of 16, a 
minimum SL value of 8 is required for the system to operate properly, whereas an SL of 16 
would support adequate system performance at 0 dB with an EL value of only 2. In this 
case we see that SL is the driving variable, that is, the variable which when set as static 
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requires a larger ESL value than the ESL value required should the other variable be set as 
static at the same value. However, if we compare this to Figure 54: Subplot D we see that 
if EL is 128, then an SL of only 2 is required between -4 dB and -6 dB to achieve the desired 
system performance. However, if SL is 128 then an EL of only 4 is required, meaning EL 
in this case is the driving variable. 
In all four subplots of Figure 54, the curve lower on the plot at a given SNR indicates 
that the variable locked to a static value to create that curve is the driving variable. What 
is important is that at lower SNRs, and thus lower EL and SL values, both the EL and SL 
variables trade places as the driving variable. However, as either variable increases to a 
certain threshold (approximately 32 based on the plots in Figure 54), the system stabilizes 
and neither variable is driving. This means that regardless of specific SL or EL values, as 
long as both are greater than 32, the system performance is adequately characterized by the 
combination of the two, which is the ESL value. Because the goal of this system is to 
achieve adequate system performance at the lowest SNR possible with the least amount of 
transmitted energy, EL can be increased to a maximum practical physical size, while 
reducing SL, which is directly related to transmitted energy, to the minimum length 
required to achieve specific system performance characteristics. 
C. PASL CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced PASL as a possible method for antenna arrays to detect and 
synchronize with an incoming signal from an unknown direction. The PASL method 
maximizes the performance of large antenna arrays by taking advantage of the zero-mean 
nature of AWGN, and several mathematical processes, to determine the presence of a 
known signal. A series of high-end estimates for ESL required for various performance 
levels were created using the results of Monte Carlo simulations and provide a baseline for 
predicting SL and EL required to facilitate detection and synchronization at very low SNR 
values (<-20 dB). 
Although the PASL process shows promise for the passive detection and 
synchronization of a signal, it is highly computationally intensive. For instance, a single 
run of the PASL process for system using an 256SL =  and 256EL =  takes an average of 
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2.4 seconds on a Surface Pro 6 computer. The largest computational requirement is the 
application of many steering vectors to each new sample received across an array. As array 
sizes grow, the number of individual antenna element samples increases and the step size 
of the sweep decreases, requiring a more powerful computational system to maintain real-
time operation. However, should a system be capable of the computational load, and an 
array size large enough, the PASL process can theoretically achieve detection and 
synchronization at any SNR value.  
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VII. SIGNAL DOA ESTIMATION 
A. PURPOSE 
DOA estimation is a critical part of UECP and is used to determine the gNB 
response direction for the connection reply. Additionally, the DOA estimate is used to 
correct the phase shift of the signal received at each antenna element to reduce bit errors in 
the payload.  
1. Estimation of Response Direction 
The UE is sending an omnidirectional connection request because the relative 
location of the gNB is unknown. Once the gNB detects the preamble of the connection 
request it can estimate the DOA for the received signal and in return use that information 
in the connection response (Figure 55). Because multipath effects are assumed negligible 
in this scenario this DOA can be used to beam steer the response of the gNB directly to the 
UE. This is critical element in the UECP in that an inaccurate DOA would decrease the 
likelihood of the UE receiving the connection reply and increases the amount energy 
classified as stray emissions.    
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Figure 55. DOA Based Off Connection Request Illustration 
2. Correction of Payload for Demodulation 
Due to the requirement for the system to operate at low SNRs, BER is a 
fundamental concern within the payload. Because the signal is being received by an 
antenna array, vice a single element, the DOA can be used to correct the signal at each 
element before summation, which in turn decreases the BER of the payload. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.   
B. SELECTION CRITERIA 
The DOA process both corrects the payload of the connection request and 
determines the return direction for a connection reply, which means a precise estimate is 
desired. However, increasing accuracy requires increasing computational power, 
processing time, or signal strength. Instead, a minimum suitable DOA estimate is required 
to ensure process efficiency. Referring to Figure 55, the connection reply must return 
directly to the UE. Should the connection reply not be directed properly at the UE, the 
amount of energy classified as stray emissions increases, and the likelihood of the UE 
properly receiving the reply decreases. Determining the minimum DOA estimate accuracy 
required to preserve the ability of the system to operate properly requires knowledge of the 
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array size being used. Figure 56 shows a response to the UE occurring from a gNB with 
two separate array sizes: 4EL =  and 8EL = .  
 
Figure 56. DOA Accuracy as a Function of Array Size 
As the array size increases, the HPBW of the response signal decreases, requiring 
a more precise DOA estimate to prevent the main lobe of the response from missing the 
target UE. Therefore, the requirement for the accuracy of the DOA estimate must be based 
upon the size of the array being used by the gNB. If the HPBW of a specific array is used 
as the starting point 
1
2error
DOA HPBW≤ is the requirement to ensure the main lobe of the 
response is sufficiently directed at the requesting UE.  
Figure 56 also shows a mock DOA estimate error distribution along with the width 
of two separate HPBWs created by arrays of different sizes. For illustration purposes, each 
of the HPBWs was placed at a particular confidence interval on the DOA estimate error 
distribution. If this were the actual error distribution of a DOA estimation process, there is 
a 99% chance the DOA estimate would be sufficient to ensure the UE was in the main lobe 
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of the connection response produced by the array responsible for HPBW1. However, if the 
same error distribution existed for an array that produced HPBW2, then there is only a 60% 
chance the DOA estimate would result in the UE being within the main lobe of the 
connection reply. Due to the impacts of AWGN on the random distribution of the DOA 
estimate error, 100% confidence cannot be achieved. However, for this research, the DOA 
estimate variance can be tied to a confidence interval that is equal to the HPBW. 
Performance will be based on 99.9%, 99%, 95%, and 80% confidence levels.  
C. DIRECTION OF ARRIVAL PROCESSES 
Although many algorithms exist for DOA estimation, only MUSIC was chosen for 
analysis and comparison against the PASL method of DOA estimation. MUSIC was chosen 
due to its widespread use and high-resolution DOA estimation capability [23].  
1. Multiple User Signal Classification 
MUSIC is an algorithm specifically designed for high-resolution DOA estimation 
and is based on utilizing the noise-subspace of a signal. Because this work is an application 
of MUSIC, this section is intended only as an introduction to the process. A more 
comprehensive explanation and associated mathematics can be found in Multiple Emitter 
Location and Signal Parameter Estimation [23] by Ralph Schmidt.  
The effectiveness of MUSIC is based on the requirement that a known number of 
signals is present, and those signals are orthogonal. These requirements are acceptable for 
this analysis since a core assumption is that connection request transmissions collisions 
will not occur and only one connection request signal will be present at a time. Figure 57 
shows the output of the MUSIC algorithm when a single signal is present, arriving at 30o 
off broadside to the array.  
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Figure 57. MUSIC Algorithm Output 
The SNR for this plot was set at 10 dB, and there is a clear peak at 30o in the output 
array. This peak is what will be stored for each iteration of a DOA Estimation Simulation 
and used to determine the DOA estimate variance. As the noise in the system increases this 
peak can become less pronounced and can lead to DOA estimation error.   
2. PASL Process Sweep Angle 
From the previous PASL chapter, we see that the PASL process includes the 
creation of a series of steering arrays that are used to correct the incoming signal, from 
which a maximum signal value is determined. The s  angle at which the maximum signal 
value occurs (referred to as maxs − ) can also be saved and used as a DOA estimate, and the 
variance of this estimate can be compared against the variance of the MUSIC DOA 
estimates.  
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D. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON OF DIRECTION OF ARRIVAL 
PROCESSES 
1. Process and Simulation Explanation 
Monte Carlo simulations were again used to characterize the DOA estimate 
variance of both the MUSIC and PASL methods. It is important to note that the variance 
produced in each method is a direct result of zero-mean AWGN which results in a 
zero-mean error distribution. Figure 58 shows the simulation process used for DOA 
estimation for both methods and is similar to the simulations used in preamble analysis and 
PASL detection and synchronization, with several modifications. 
 
Figure 58. DOA Estimation Simulation Process 
First, because this analysis is only meant to ascertain the DOA estimation 
capabilities of PASL and MUSIC, and not necessarily test the detection and 
synchronization results of those DOA estimations, the threshold input variable, leading/
lagging zero padding of the signal, and the matched filter used previously are no longer 
used. This isolates the DOA estimation processes as the only feature being tested for each 
process. The second major modification compared to previous simulations is that the output 
of this simulation is the DOA estimate error distribution and variance for each method.  
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If MUSIC produced a more accurate DOA estimate, that estimate could be used to 
unsteer the received signal (using Equation 24 with maxsθ − replaced by the output of the 
MUSIC) and produce greater detection and synchronization performance. However, as will 
be demonstrated in this section, the DOA estimate produced by MUSIC is far less accurate 
than PASL given the specific attributes of the system being studied in this research (low 
signal energy and large array sizes). What this means is that the maxsθ −  angle produced 
during PASL will result in a corrected signal much closer to the original signal sent, and 
thus have far better detection and synchronization performance.  
One other important note concerning this simulation is that both PASL and the 
MUSIC algorithms use an angular sweep to determine the angle at which a maximum 
occurs. Since a portion of the DOA estimate error, and therefore the variance, is caused by 
the granularity of the sweep angle step size, an equal step size of 
1
2
HPBW  was used for 
both processes. Additionally, because both the MUSIC and PASL method’s performance 
are affected by SL and EL, all simulations were run using equal input variable values for 
both methods.  
2. Direction of Arrival Estimation Results 
The MUSIC and PASL processes were compared using SL and EL ranges of 32, 
64, and 128. The first analysis, seen in Figure 59, shows the DOA estimate variance of 
both processes at 0SNR =  dB. Each plot shows the results when either EL or SL is locked, 
and the other parameter varied. What is observed is that both processes are capable of very 
low DOA estimate variance regardless of the combination of parameters. However, UECP 
by design is required to function in very low SNR situations.  
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Figure 59. MUSIC and PASL DOA Variance at 0SNR =  dB 
To understand the DOA estimation performance at low SNRs, the simulation was 
run again with SNR set to -20 dB. The results can be found in Figure 59 and show that as 
the SNR decreases, the DOA estimation performance of PASL greatly exceeds the 
performance of MUSIC. Even more importantly, we can see that when the SL is locked at 
a specific value, the performance increases of PASL are substantially higher than MUSIC 
as the EL value increases. With a locked SL of 32, and as EL increases from 32 to 128, the 
DOA estimation variance of MUSIC drops from 2298 to 1225 degrees squared, whereas 
PASL drops from 1842 to 120 degrees squared. Neither of these variances are sufficient 
for DOA estimation, but the trend shows PASL is far more effective when EL increases.  
Observing the results when the SL is locked at 128, MUSIC drops from 1235 to 72 
degrees squared, and PASL drops from 566 to 0.013 degrees squared. Additionally, at an 
SL of 128, PASL rapidly drops as EL increases from 32 to 64. This point will be addressed 
in greater depth in the following section. Because the goal of the system is to reduce signal 
energy by reducing SL (thus energy emitted), and capitalizing on the performance gains 
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through raising EL, PASL shows a clear advantage over MUSIC in producing usable DOA 
estimates at lower SNRs.  
 
Figure 60. MUSIC and PASL DOA Variance at  20SNR = −  dB 
Now that PASL has been shown to produce more accurate at DOA estimates than 
MUSIC, specifically at the desired operating ranges and parameter values for UECP, it is 
important to determine if parity exists between the preamble detection and synchronization 
step and the DOA estimation step. To do this, we can compare the variance of PASL DOA 
estimates against the variance required to produce various confidence levels needed to 
ensure the UE is with the HPBW of the connection response. Variance for specific 
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where HPBW is based on EL (computed using Equation 25), n is the number of Monte 
Carlo trials, and /2zα  is the critical value for the confidence level. 
As with previous analyses, a multitude of Monte Carlo simulations were performed 
and plots for many different parameter values were analyzed, but only select plots are 
displayed to illustrate major points. All other parameter sets and resulting plots show the 
same behavior as those contained within this work. Figure 61 shows the DOA estimate 
variance of the PASL process with EL set to 32 and 128 and various SL values and SNR 
levels. 
 
Figure 61. PASL DOA Variance vs. SL 
As expected, at a given EL the variance of the DOA estimate decreases as SL 
increases. Referring back to Figure 50, we can see that at an ESL of 16384 the ROCA is 
0.999, and in Figure 60 an ESL of only 8192 (EL=128, SL=64) is required to adequately 
exceed the 99.9% confidence level for a DOA estimate. This means that if detection and 
synchronization occur the maxsθ −  value found during the PASL process is sufficiently 
accurate to use as the DOA estimate for the connection response signal.  
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E. DOA ESTIMATION CONCLUSION 
This section detailed the two methods that can be used for DOA estimation: 
MUSIC, and PASL. MUSIC is a more powerful algorithm in that it can detect multiple 
orthogonal signals simultaneously, without prior knowledge of the signal, but is limited in 
its ability to detect a single unknown signal in a low SNR environment. PASL proved to 
be a more effective DOA estimation tool given its ability to estimate DOA by using a 
known signal value to correlate against a received signal that is steered through a series of 
possible DOA angles. Additionally, using PASL incurs no additional computational time. 
The maxsθ −  value found during the detection and synchronization step proved to be accurate 
enough to provide a high likelihood of the connection reply being directed towards the 
requesting UE.  
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VIII. PAYLOAD CORRECTION AND USE 
A. PURPOSE 
The final critical element requiring analysis in UECP is the BER of the payload 
once detection and synchronization have occurred and the payload is demodulated and 
decrypted. The payload is important to the process in that it is used by the receiving device 
to authorize the sender and ensure a reply is appropriate. Errors within the payload decrease 
the ability of the gNB or UE to properly determine the validity of the connection request.  
1. Maximum Gain in Direction of Arriving Signal 
As discussed earlier in this work, the benefit of an array comes in the form of gain 
if the direction of the signal is known. The PASL process showed that by steering the 
incident signals on each antenna element and correlating the resulting signal against a 
known signal it can both determine the presence of a preamble, as well as produce a 
high-accuracy DOA estimate. Using this DOA estimate from the preamble, the system can 
steer the received payload such that maximum gain is achieved.  
2. Authorization of UE and gNB 
The payload contains the UE AuthCode, a time stamp, as well as EDAC (the 
purpose of which will be made clear in this section). If the BER is too high, the information 
needed to authorize the request, specifically the AuthCode and time stamp, will be 
corrupted and result in a failed authorization and thus no connection reply being sent. It is 
important to clarify the approach used to analyze BER within the context of this work. A 
perfect BER of zero would mean that if the AuthCode received is valid then there would 
be a zero probability of the requesting device not being validated. Any BER above zero 
would result in the possibility of a valid AuthCode not being validated if it is being 
compared directly to an authorized whitelist. The exact probability of a valid AuthCode 
being rejected would be a combination of the AuthCode length and BER in the system. 
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B. PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS 
1. Process and Simulation  
Monte Carlo simulations constructed in MATLAB were again used to analyze the 
effects of payload correction and the resulting BER of the payload. The simulation process 
can be seen in Figure 62. 
 
Figure 62. BER Testing Process 
This simulation is similar to previous simulations run, with several modifications. 
First, along with preamble generation, there is also a payload generation, which is then 
modulated using QPSK. This modulation was used because QPSK shares the same BER 
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as BPSK modulation but can transmit twice the information in the same signal length. Next, 
the preamble and payload are concatenated into a single connection request signal. The 
steering and reception of the signal follows previous simulation processes. For this 
simulation, however, once the maxsθ −  value is found from the PASL process, it is then used 
to correct the payload portion of the received signal (using Equation 24). Once that has 
occurred, the payload is then demodulated and compared against the original payload value 
to count bit errors and estimate BER.   
2. Bit Error Rate Analysis 
The first step in BER analysis is to determine the effectiveness of correcting the 
payload based upon the maxsθ −  value found during the PASL process. Figure 63 shows the 
BER simulation results for a PASL-corrected signal, an array that is not corrected, a single 
element, and lastly, the single element theoretical BER. Note that the horizontal axis is no 
longer SNR, but rather /b oE N since QPSK modulation was used, and because of this is 
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where M is the modulation order, bE  is the bit energy, and oN  is the noise power spectral 












Figure 63. Payload BERs 
The payload BER when no correction is applied is essentially 1/2, whereas the BER 
when PASL correction is applied is greatly reduced. It is also clear that the PASL correction 
has significant improvements over the BER when only a single antenna element was used. 
This analysis was done using only a set value for SL and EL (128), and a better 
understanding of the impacts of either parameter is important.  
The next analysis sought to determine the impacts of either SL or EL on the BER of 
the payload by fixing one parameter at 32 and varying the other through a range of values 
from 8 to 256 (Figure 63). 
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Figure 64. BER with Varying SL and EL 
What is clearly seen is that at a fixed EL, increasing the SL of the preamble has very 
little impact on reducing the BER of the payload after it is corrected using the outcome of 
the PASL process. However, when the preamble length (SL) is fixed, increasing EL has 
significant impacts on reducing the BER of the payload. This is a very good characteristic 
in that UECP seeks to reduce signal energy (lower SL) and instead capitalize on very large 
arrays (larger EL) to maintain system usability.  
The final point concerning Figure 64 is that the BER, even with very large EL 
values, is prohibitively high, and regardless of AuthCode length and validation method 
would result in the rejection of some percentage of valid AuthCodes. This work does not 
specify a BER requirement as that would be system specific attribute based on the specific 
system application and validation processes used.  
C. PAYLOAD CORRECTION CONCLUSION 
This section showed that BER can be improved by using the maxsθ −  value 
determined during the PASL process to correct the payload signals received at the array 
elements before demodulation. Additionally, BER showed very little improvement when 
SL (preamble length in this case) is increased but showed significant improvement as EL 
increased. This attribute aligns with the focus of this research in minimizing transmitted 
energy and instead capitalizing on the benefits of large antenna arrays. Lastly, even with 
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payload correction before demodulation, the BER of the system is high enough to 
compromise the information contained in the payload and therefore requires EDAC to 
ensure proper authorization and response. The specific EDAC method used and BER 
requirement is going to be system dependent and beyond the scope of this work.  
  
103 
IX. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND FOLLOW-ON WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The UECP process seeks to provide a new method for devices to connect in 
EM-sensitive environments while maintaining the functionality of the 5G NR architecture. 
The primary driver for developing a new method of initial access was to reduce the amount 
of energy classified as stray emissions that occur during commercial 5G NR operations. 
This can be accomplished in two steps. First, the 5G NR initial access procedures can be 
replaced with a process that eliminates the requirement for the transmission of periodic 
broadcast signals in the form of SSBs to search for UEs within the coverage area. Second, 
a novel process was required that was able to function at much lower SNRs than traditional 
5G NR initial access procedures. 
UECP replaces 5G NR UE search processes with a UE-side connection request, 
which a gNB can use to authorize the UE and estimate a DOA for the connection reply. By 
initiating the connection from the UE, we can capitalize on the larger antenna arrays that 
generally exist at the gNB. This greatly reduces the stray emissions created by a gNB 
during traditional 5G NR search processes. With this new method, however, came new 
challenges. Because the connection request must be transmitted omnidirectionally and 
should produce as little signal energy as possible, the gNB must be able to detect a request 
at very low SNRs. This was solved by the development of the novel PASL process, which 
uses various steering vectors to correct the incident signal across all antenna elements 
before correlating them against the known preamble signal value, improving detection and 
synchronization. The performance of this method was shown to be reliant on the size of 
the antenna array, given the incoming signal preamble met a minimum length requirement.  
The PASL process also demonstrated higher fidelity DOA estimates when 
compared to the commonly used DOA algorithm, MUSIC, and is capable of estimating the 
DOA such that a requesting UE will be within the HPBW of the connection reply with a 
high level of certainty. The DOA estimate output of the PASL process can also be used to 
correct the payload signals received before demodulation, which greatly decreased the 
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BER. However, due to the SNR ranges this system should be operating in, the BER still 
proved to be prohibitively high and would require EDAC to ensure the information can be 
recovered and used for authorization.  
Throughout this research, it was shown that all the processes and methods used 
would benefit from the creation and utilization of very large antenna arrays. As array sizes, 
frequencies used, and computational power of systems increase, the methods proposed in 
this work could facilitate initial access of 5G NR-based systems in environments where 
EM emissions need to be tightly controlled.  
B. FOLLOW ON RESEARCH AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. DDOS and Jamming Protection 
Although the attack model in this work assumed Eve had the ability to craft and 
send a connection request, it assumed Eve did not have the ability to jam either the UE or 
gNB, or continually transmit in a denial-of-service type attack. These are important 
considerations for the battlefield environment and are worthy of study should this system 
ever be implemented.  
2. EDAC for Payload 
It was shown that despite the ability of UECP to detect, synchronize, and compute 
accurate DOAs, it is unable to reduce the BER of the payload enough to allow information 
to be recovered directly. There are many methods of EDAC used within commercial 
communications systems, and further study is required to determine which method of 
EDAC works most efficiently with the UECP process.  
3. PASL Mathematics Efficiency 
The PASL method is very effective in facilitating the connection of two devices 
within the constraints of the environment mentioned in this work. However, the PASL 
process is highly computationally intensive in its current form. Because PASL must occur 
in real-time, the efficiency of the mathematics is highly important. Although the currently 
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proposed mathematical processes work, further study into optimizing and increasing the 
efficiency of the process is warranted.  
4. Signal Length Optimization/Large Value Simulations 
Throughout this work signal length and array length were two primary parameters 
used for analysis in each step. Although it was shown that a trade space exists between 
these two variables, there also exists a lower bound where UECP performance is difficult 
to predict. Additionally, as the signal length decreases, the array length must increase, but 
the exact performance of the system at ultra-high array lengths and ultra-low sequence 
lengths has not been fully explored. The PASL process is computationally intensive, and 
as either the sequence or array values get too large, the computational time required 
becomes prohibitive, and high-power computational platforms would be required to 
conduct the Monte Carlo simulations. Further analysis at these extreme values using a high-
power computer would be prudent to determine if the characterizations presented in this 
work are valid in more extreme cases.  
5. Signal Length and Time Stamp Analysis 
The requirement for a time Stamp was presented earlier in this work, but a more 
definitive determination of the range of allowable values, based on the connection request 
length is required. As the signal length increases, the probability of Eve being able to 
randomly create a signal that could fool either the UE or gNB decreases. The larger the 
signal, the more time it would take Eve to test all possible signal values, but the greater the 
energy emitted during the connection request process. Decreasing signal length decreases 
the time it would take Eve to craft a valid connection request through random signal 
creation and would therefore force a decrease in the acceptable time stamp window. The 
practical application of UECP would require some knowledge of Eve’s ability to craft and 
transmit signals, as well as a probability threshold of Eve being able to craft a valid request 
through arbitrary connection request creation that could be used to determine the maximum 
allowable time stamp window.  
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6. Retransmission Optimization 
UECP is built to work in low SNR environments, and part of this is the 
implementation of a signal power step increase each time a UE connection request fails to 
solicit a reply. Further exploration of the effects of a signal power increase on the system’s 
ability to establish a connection and optimum power step size would be prudent prior to 
implementing UECP in a real-world environment.  
7. Optimum Array Sizes 
Throughout this work array sizes up to 8192 elements were used as a theoretical 
upper bound maximum. This size array, even at the upper end of 5G NR frequencies would 
still produce a physical array that is too large for practical use. Further study into the 
optimum array size to balance gains realized with real world physical size constraints  
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